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Abstract
This paper aims to theoretically clarify the following two points. First, even
though the government shows favoritism toward the poor and wants to exempt
low-income taxpayers and secure its necessary income tax revenue by taxing
only high-income taxpayers, the government ends up taxing the poor, which is
in opposition to favoritism, due to its inability to observe individual taxpayers'
income levels. Second, even without observing each taxpayers' income level,
if favoritism is suciently strong, the government can discontinuously resolve
such unintentional taxation.
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to clarify two points from the standpoint of microeconomic
theory. First, even though the government makes a value judgment in terms
of showing preference (i.e., favoritism) to the poor and wants to exempt low-
income earners and secure its necessary income tax revenue by taxing only
high-income earners, the government ends up taxing the poor, which is in direct
opposition to favoritism, due to its inability to directly observe each taxpayer's
income level. Second, even without observing each taxpayer's income level, if
favoritism is suciently strong, the government can discontinuously resolve such
unintentional taxation. This paper, which represents favoritism by the weight
that the government places on the income levels of the poor, shows that when
this weight exceeds a certain threshold, a discontinuity exists in the tax struc-
ture that reduces the tax burden on the poor. In addition, the model used in
this study is premised on strategic interactions between taxpayers who conceal
income and the tax authorities who uncover unreported income. Previous work
on tax law enforcement based on this premise includes Greatz, Reinganum, and
Wilde (1986) and a follow-up work by Chander and Wilde (1992). Both of
these works exogenously provide an income tax structure (i.e., how much tax
to impose on taxpayers of dierent income level) using comparative statistics
in relation to the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, this paper presents a model,
within the income tax revenue constraints of the Nash equilibrium, in which
the government endogenously determines an income tax structure that focuses
on the income levels of the poor rather than those of the auent. In general,
the ability to enforce capital punishment is a crime deterrent, even in the ab-
sence of observability (Ehrlich, 1975). However, in actuality, such punishment
is not imposed in tax evasion cases. The reasons for this have been discussed
by Pestieau et al. (1994) among other works. The present paper focuses on
how governments by imposing heavy maximum penalties on those who conceal
income levels, instead of attempting to prevent tax evasion, aects the nature
of tax revenue constraints. This paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the game between taxpayers and the tax authority, as well as the Nash
equilibrium of the game. The third section presents the government's decision
tree in formulating a tax structure and shows a tax structure determined by
government favoritism. Finally, the fourth section interprets the results and
compares them with the case of perfect information.
2 The Game Between Taxpayers and Tax Au-
thorities and the Nash Equilibrium
Let us consider a simultaneous-move game between multiple taxpayers and a tax
authority. The taxpayer population is normalized to 1. Among taxpayers, the
proportion q of players has high incomes (IH) , while the remaining proportion
1   q has low incomes (IL). Each taxpayer les a tax return. In other words,
taxpayers with IH (IL) report their income to the authority and pay taxes of
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TH (TL) on their reported income.
Suppose income taxes are progressive (i.e., TH>TL). While the tax author-
ity is aware of the above-mentioned income distribution, we postulate that it
is common knowledge that the tax authority does not know the income level
of each individual taxpayer. If high-income taxpayers pay cost K to conceal
income and falsely declare a low income to the tax authority, they will be able
to avoid paying taxes of T=TH TL. Let the probability that a high-income
taxpayer makes a false tax declaration be denoted as .
Assigning a value of  arbitrarily using Bayes' theorem, the tax authority
can estimate the proportion  of tax evaders among high-income taxpayers using
 = q=(q+ 1  q) (1)
Simultaneously, the tax authority can verify whether income has been con-
cealed by spending the cost necessary to conduct a tax audit. Let the probability
of the tax authority conducting an audit be C. Let the probability of the tax
authority conducting an audit be . The authority imposes F<I=IH IL on
those found to be tax evaders. In addition, the government later gives tax
authorities a reward equivalent to the concealed income they uncovered.
Figure 1 illustrates the model described above in the form of a game tree.
The circled letters N, T, and A represent the moves of Nature, the Taxpayer,
and the tax Authority, respectively. The dotted line connecting two moves
represents the information set. Furthermore, a and n represent an audit or
lack of an audit, respectively. The expressions in parentheses to the left of the
comma represent, payo to the taxpayer, and, that to the right of the comma,
represents payo to the tax authority.
For simplication, both the taxpayers and the tax authority are assumed to
be risk-neutral. In setting up this model, we can formulate the expected benet
for the high-income earner (UH) as
UH(; ) = ((IH TH F K)+(1 )(IH TL K)+(1 )(IH TH) (2)
and the expected benet for the tax authority () as
(; ) = (()I   C) (3)
The partial derivatives for  in Equation (2) are linear in relation to .
Furthermore, because U= =  (F + K), when  = 1, if T > K, then 0
exists in (0,1) according to the intermediate value theorem. However, because
0=(T  K)=(T + F ), the taxpayer's best reaction is
()
8><>:
= 1 if  < 0
2 [0; 1] if  = 0
= 0 if  > 0
(4)
On the other hand, the tax authority's best reaction is
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()
8><>:
= 1 if () > 0
2 [0; 1] if () = 0
= 0 if () < 0
(5)
,where 0 = C=I. Because () has been already dened, we can obtain
0 = (1   q)C=q(I   C). When I > C=q, then 0 2 (0; 1) Therefore, the
authority's best reaction is as follows: when C < I, then
()
8><>:
= 1 if  > 0
2 [0; 1] if  = 0
= 0 if  < 0
(6)
Equations (4) and (6) yield the following proposition.
Proposition 1:　 If T > K and I > C=q, then the Nash equilibrium is a
mixed strategy, i.e., (0; 0).
3 Optimal Taxation Structure
In the game between taxpayers and the tax authority, if the Nash equilibrium is
realized as (0; 0), then as long as TL, TH , and F are given, the government
is confronted with the following net expected tax revenue: 　　　
Re = q00(TH+F )+(1 q)(0TL+(1 0)(q0+1 q)TL+q(1 0)TH q00I
(7)
The sum of the rst four terms in the right-hand side is gross tax revenue,
and the fth term is the reward given to the authority. In this paper, we
suppose that the government requires substantial tax revenues, and therefore
focus on a case in which the required tax revenues are nanced solely by income
tax revenues. Representing the required tax revenue as Re, we can obtain the
following lemma for the constraints facing the government in determining the
tax structure:
Lemma:　When R= Re and F is bounded, the set (T; TL) for the govern-
ment's tax structure is strictly convex for T .
(For proof, see Appendix.)
To analyze the optimal tax structure under the above-mentioned constraints,
we dene economic welfare W e as the weighted sum of the payo for truthful
tax lers as follows:
W e = (1  )q(IH   TL) + (1  q)(IL   TL) (8)
In this formalization,  > 1 represents government favoritism. That is, with
regard to the benet extended to accurate tax lers, when determining the tax
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structure, the government places more pressure on low-income earners than on
high-income earners.
Fixing W e in the above equation as W > 0 and solving for TL gives the
following equation:
TL =
(1  )IH + s(1  q)IL   W e   (1  )qT
(1  )q + (1  q) (9)
The graph of this equation, which is in Quadrant I of the coordinates (T; TL),
shifts to the southwest as W increases.
When  is suciently small, Equation (9) can be described as the solid line
shown in Figure 2-a, and TH = TL > 0 at equilibrium. On the other hand, as 
increases, the graph rotates counterclockwise and shifts to the solid line shown
in Figure 2-b such that the optimal tax structure jumps to TH > TL = 0.
Thus, we formulate the following proposition using the Lemma and Equation
(9).
Proposition 2: The tax structure that maximizes W e under tax revenue con-
straints is one of the two corner solutions with regard to government's favoritism
.
Therefore, even if the government shows favoritism toward the poor, when
this favoritism is suciently weak, the same income tax is imposed on the poor
as on the auent; however, as favoritism becomes stronger, the government can
oer tax exemptions to the poor even if information asymmetry exists.
4 Conclusion
When the government is unable to determine who is poor (i.e., when informa-
tion asymmetry exists regarding income), the government may impose a very
heavy income tax burden on low-income earners. In this paper, however, we
have shown that this situation can be resolved through strong governmental
favoritism.
With perfect information, the government can maximize W = q(IH TH)+
(1  q)(IL   TL) subject to tax revenue constraint R = qTH + (1  q)TL such
that at equilibrium, TH > TL = 0 on the plane (TL; TH). In other words, tax
exemptions for the poor are realized in relation to governmental favoritism .
Therefore, the results we obtained under conditions of asymmetrical infor-
mation show that the tax structure problem can be completely resolved, even
if the government does not know which taxpayers are truly poor.
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Appendix:Proof of Lemma:
Setting Re = R > 0 and substituting TH = T + TL and 0 = T  K=T + F
in Equation (7), we obtain
TL =
 qT 2  BT +D
T + F
(10)
,where B = qF   q(I   K)0   R, D =  q(I   F )K0   F R. When
I < F , then because TL(0) > 0, there is an intercept on the vertical axis,
as shown in the graph in Figure 2. On dierentiating the above equation, we
get dTL=dT =  qT 2 + (B   2qF )T + D=(T + F )2. To check the sign, we
put the numerator on the right-hand side of G. When R is suciently large,
G(0) < 0 and dG=dT =  2q(T + F )T + B < 0. Furthermore, because T 0,
which is satised by dG=dT 0 = 0, is negative, then G < 0 for arbitrary T > 0.
Therefore, dTL=dT < 0. In solving for T , which is satised by dTL=dT  = 0,
we get T  =  F+( Bp(2qF  B)2 + 4qD)= 2q,so when R is large enough,
T  > 0. Therefore, Equation (10) is strictly convex in relation to T .
Q.E.D.
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